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The Department of the Army routinely conducts water system vulnerability assessment (WSVA) 
on military water distribution systems (WDS).  Risk assessors construct attack scenarios and then 
estimate the risks using their expert  judgment.  These risk assessments are traditionally difficult 
to support with evidence and historical data.  As a result, decision makers often question the 
validity of the assessor findings and their recommendations.  The goal of this research paper is to 
improve the WSVA program by presenting decision makers with quantifiable risk.  I propose a 
hybrid risk analysis based on hydraulic modeling and probabilistic risk analysis.  This improved 
methodology (WSVA2) presents a quantitative approach to risk assessment and uses simulations 
to support the assessor’s expert judgment.  A fictitious military WDS and its data are created to 
avoid disclosure of sensitive information.  Hydraulic simulation models are used to assess the 
consequences of a successful contamination attack and to evaluate the outcome of a catastrophic  
scenario.  Three unknowns of the scenarios are the contaminant toxicity, contaminant reaction 
rate in water and contaminant quantity used in the attack.  Attack simulations are randomly 
generated using distribution curves based on both known studies and assumptions.  Monte Carlo 
simulations are used to quantify the uncertainties of the model.  Findings show that 53,126 
Exposure Incidents (EI) resulted from the contamination attack on Water Tower 1.  In the 
catastrophic scenario, over 400,000 EI occurred in 1 week which affected over 4,000 people in 
the Hexagon Building.  And in an attack-response scenario, hydraulic modeling is used to 
demonstrate that the current Emergency Response Plan (ERP) cannot sufficiently mitigate the 
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The Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002 required the Department of the Army to routinely 
conduct water system vulnerability assessments (WSVA) on United States (U.S.) military water 
distribution systems (WDS).  A standard qualitative risk analysis adapted from various Federal 
agencies is the current methodology used to conduct the WSVA.  Physical destruction, 
contamination, and cyber attacks on the WDS are the three focuses of the assessment.   
 
In the past, Army assessment teams traveled to various military installations to conduct the 
WSVA and present their risk findings and recommendations to the installation commander 
(decision maker).  The risk evaluation process is based on the first three steps of the Army Risk 
management process.  Each WSVA team is responsible for identifying and assessing hazards, 
estimating probability and severity, and assigning a risk category (e.g. High, Medium or Low 
Risk) for each scenario (USACHPPM TG 188, 2008).  Unfortunately, the risk presented in each 
assessment is inconsistent because it is based on expert judgment and loosely defined guidelines.  
Furthermore, the results are not strongly supported by relevant data.  Decision makers have 
openly questioned the effectiveness of the WSVA and their recommendations, and some 
unnecessary and costly countermeasures could result if assessor recommendations were 
implemented at military facilities.  
 
This research paper aims to improve the current WSVA with the use of hydraulic modeling 
verification.  EPANet 2.0 (hydraulic simulation software) is used to model the transport of 
contaminants throughout a military WDS in order to evaluate attack scenarios and mitigation 
methods.  In addition, probabilistic risk analysis based on the hydraulic modeling results is used 




as WSVA2.  The Department of Defense (DOD) could substitute actual data into the WSVA2 
model and make it a realistic risk assessment tool for military WDS. 
 
1.1 Assessor bias and intuitive risk judgments   
 
There are several factors which will lead to assessor bias in the current WSVA.  First, members 
of the assessment teams are not risk experts with extensive analytical training.  Generally 
speaking, WSVA risk assessors rely on their intuitive judgments.  Like most Americans, the 
assessors have risk perceptions based on their individual knowledge and experience.  
Unfortunately, the dominant perception for most Americans is one that contrasts sharply with the 
views of professional risk assessors.  The untrained risk assessor believes that “they face more 
risk today than in the past and that future risks will be even greater than today’s” (Slovic, 1987).   
 
Second, data is not easily obtainable in regards to military infrastructure vulnerability.  
Incomplete or irrelevant data in reference to attacks on water systems could likely be 
misinterpreted by the assessors.  If the relevant data was available, statistical analysis may be able 
to help improve the understanding of potential threats than current WSVA methods of analysis, 
though how well such data would represent future threat scenarios would need to be determined.     
 
Third, personal expertise influences every WSVA.  Probability assessments reflect expert 
knowledge as intended, but it also influences the individual risk assessor conducting the 
assessment (Guikema and Aven, 2011).  Simply stated, all assessors have bias and they don’t 
know that they have bias.  However, if they recognize their own bias, they can use it to improve 
their assessment.  Often, an assessor with an engineering background may offer different 




environmental health background.  Their assessments will likely lead to disagreements using the 
same risk methodology.   
 
Lastly, the risk assessment results are ambiguous in nature and will fail the Clarity Test.  A 
decision maker may ask, “What is the risk of contamination to my WDS?”  And the assessor 
cannot answer the decision maker with specific time periods, contamination exposure incidents, 
how much of the WDS is at risk, and so on.  In the current WSVA methodology, the presented 
results may lead to ambiguity and miscommunication on the nature of the risk.   
  
1.2 WSVA2 Improvements  
 
The WSVA2 methodology incorporates hydraulic modeling and probabilistic risk analysis to 
improve the strength of the WSVA.  Three steps are added to the original methodology (Figure 
1).  First, when assessing hazards (WSVA step 2), qualitative threat and vulnerability assessments 
are converted into quantitative scores.  The assessor will use Multi Attribute Utility Theory 
(MAUT) to assess the decision maker's disutility (preference) in regards to consequences.  The 
second addition is to use hydraulic modeling to estimate the consequences of the considered 
scenarios.  If assessors speculate that a specific attack scenario has a high consequence, hydraulic 
modeling results can support or refute the assessors’ claim.  Lastly, changing the risk 
classification from a qualitative to a quantitative scale will assist decision makers in 






Figure 1.  WSVA Methodology and WSVA2 Additions 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Water System Vulnerability Assessments  
 
Army guideline states that current procedures and safeguards are adequate to prevent 
unintentional contamination of water operations and possibly alert the installation to acts of 
terrorism.  However, it also states that with relatively little effort, terrorists can assault the WDS 
and cause catastrophic effects (USACHPPM TG 188, 2008).  Currently, most military WDS are 
managed by civilian contractors.  Whether current safeguards are enough to quickly detect water 
contamination is questionable.  In 2013, the American Society of Civil Engineers reported that 
America’s water infrastructure earned an overall grade of D.  In addition, an estimated $1 trillion 
is required over the next 25 years for the most urgent pipe replacements  (American Society of 
Civil Engineers, 2013).  Given the generally poor state of water system infrastructure in the U.S., 
it is unlikely that current safeguards are enough to deter a determined attack on the military WDS, 
despite its secure location.  Presumably, a successful attack on the WDS can occur given current 
realities.  Therefore, WSVA2 will also need to seriously evaluate the effectiveness of the 






2.2 Infrastructure Interdependency 
 
The WDS is a critical infrastructure (CI) integrated into many aspects of daily military 
operations.  Often, decision makers take the WDS for granted not understanding the 
interdependencies between it and other military infrastructures.  An attack on one CI may cause a 
cascading effort onto other infrastructures, ultimately degrading military readiness.  One unique 
aspect of military installations is that they contain significant amounts of technological computer 
and communication equipment essential for the modern combat environment.  These sensitive 
equipments require environmental control systems that are dependent on water to function 
properly.  Without a constant water supply to the building, environmental control systems will 
eventually shut down and cause the indoor temperature to rise rapidly.  As a precaution, the 
sensitive computer equipment may self shutdown much sooner to prevent overheating.  The rate 
of failure increases as modern infrastructures become more advanced and interdependent on CI 
(Macaulay, 2009).  An attack on the WDS may cause unforeseeable secondary and tertiary effects 
on military operations.  Therefore, risk assessors must recognize the rippling effect of CI failure 
and discuss these risks with decision makers.   
 
2.3 Blue Zone (Virtual City)   
 
WDS websites and Google Maps ™ contain information that can potentially be exploited by 
individuals or groups with malicious intent.  In order to protect sensitive information, a virtual 
military district and its WDS was created based on the foundations of Micropolis (Brumbelow et 
al., 2007).  This research created Blue Zone, which mimics a American military district in a 
hostile country but is entirely fictitious.  CI details are built into Blue Zone to better assess the 
consequences of water disruption.  Many of Blue Zone's hydraulic characteristics are imported 




foreign and American government buildings which employs 10,000 people.  The main building of 
focus, the Hexagon building, employs 6,900 American service members, defense contractors, and 
diplomats during the day time.  The zone’s 11 primary buildings, roads, and hydraulic network 
are shown in Figure 2.  Blue Zone’s WDS is comprised of a network of 211 pipes built in the 
1950s.  The U.S. military made additional improvements to the WDS in 2013 but the overall 
distribution is still in poor quality due to a lack of maintenance of many years.  Due to its 
strategic importance, sophisticated water quality monitors were installed in the Hexagon building 
to detect water quality degradation.  A single 2.20 million gallon (8,339,996 liter) elevated water 
tower (Water Tower 1) is located in northern section.  A 1.65 million gallon (6,254,997 liter) 
water tank (Water Tank 2) is located within the Hexagon building to serve as a backup.  
 
Two local Water Treatment Plants located north and south outside of the area displayed in Figure 
2 supply Blue Zone with potable water.  The WDS is specified down to individual service 
connections for the majority of Blue Zone.  The Hexagon building has a higher resolution of 
water connections to better demonstrate the contaminant transport effects using EPANet 2.0.  In 
order to mimic the chaotic infrastructure of the host country, the WDS was built in a manner that 
is functional but not in accordance with first world infrastructure codes.  The hydraulic model 
includes 198 nodes, 6 valves, 4 pumps, 2 reservoirs and 2 tanks.  The WDS demand nodes are 
composed of 11 institutional and 1 commercial user (Hexagon Café).  Commercial and 
institutional water demands were based on the research by Haestad (Haestad et al., 2003).  The 
total daily demand of the WDS is 5.58 MGD with minimum and maximum hourly demands of 






Figure 2.  Blue Zone  
 
2.4 Hydraulic modeling 
  
Hydraulic and contaminant fate and transport modeling can be used to verify scenarios that the 
assessor considers high impact.  This paper will demonstrate the use of hydraulic modeling on 
only one scenario.  Unless significant resources are available, it is simply not feasible to model 
every conceivable scenario.  The hydraulic models for this research paper are based on the 
techniques from Torres et al. (2009).  Torres demonstrated EPANet 2.0's hydraulic, contaminant 
fate and transport modeling potential on the virtual city of Micropolis.  The two governing 
equations of fluid mechanics used in EPANet are the conservation of mass (continuity) equation 
and conservation of energy (Rossman, 2000).   
 




   
 
  
                                           
c is the contaminant concentration at time t, c0 is the initial contaminant concentration, k is the 
growth / (-k) decay constant, and t is the time elapsed since the introduction of contaminant into 
the system (Torres et al., 2009).    
 
Torres et al. also demonstrated the use of Monte Carlo simulations in Visual Basic to quantify 
outcome uncertainties.  To build on Torres’ work, this paper used MATLAB R2013a in 
conjunction with EPANet Toolkit to run iterative hydraulic simulations.   
 
2.5 Agent Based Modeling 
 
In a contamination event, consumers collectively influence the hydraulic state of the WDS which 
will affect the number of people exposed to the contaminant.  Each consumer has a set of 
behavior such as mobility, ingestion of tap water, changes in water usage and notifying other 
people.  Zechman (2011) used Agent Based Modeling (ABM) to demonstrate the interactions 
among consumers based on word-of mouth communication.  This paper did not use a 
sophisticated model as such ABM to predict consumer water demand decrease.  However, it did 
use a simplistic non-linear method to account for consumer compliance after the public 
announcement is issued by the military.      
 
2.6 Value Trees  
 
Apostolakis and Lemon (2005) developed a value tree for the prioritization of MIT infrastructure 
for security protection to represent the values of its various stakeholders.  For simplicity, I use the 




reassessed in light of the likely differences in preferences between an open, urban campus and a 
secure military facility. This reassessment was beyond the scope of the present work.  The final 
value tree of an attack on the WDS is shown in Figure 3.  The weights (performance measures) 
may vary for each military installation due to the different adverse impacts the attack may have 
on operations.   
 
Figure 3.  Value Tree for Terrorism Consequences  
 
2.7 Contaminant Exposure 
 
In Epidemiology, exposure is defined as “a state of contact or close proximity to a chemical…by 
ingesting, breathing, or direct contact (http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/exposure).” Common forms of exposure to water contaminant 
are by ingestion or skin exposure.  Water vapor inhalation is also possible but the effects are 




potable water is typically of concern for more chronic health effects.  In the hydraulic model, 
exposure occurs when a person consumes water from a contaminated node.  Each time this 
occurs, it is recorded as an exposure incident (EI).  If a person received multiple EI in a short 
amount of time, it would significantly increase their health risk and cause substantial concern.  
There may be a variety of naturally occurring contaminants in the WDS, but decision makers 
should only concern themselves with contaminant concentrations above the military exposure 
guidelines (MEG).  MEGs are similar to the EPA’s Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL), which 
are guidelines to evaluate the significance of contaminant exposure.  In some instances, MEG 
levels are slightly higher than MCL because all consumers are assumed older than the military 
age of 18 in the Blue Zone.  
 
Usually, decision makers would like to know the worst case scenario of a contamination event.  
However, both high level and low level exposures are concerns which could lead to adverse 
outcomes.  High-level exposures could result in immediate health effects and/or significant 
impacts to mission capabilities.  Low-level exposures may result in delayed and / or long-term 
health effects that would not ordinarily have a significant immediate impact (USACHPPM TG 
188, 2008).  Realistically, the worst case scenario is rarely known, but there are many lower 
levels of adverse health impacts less severe than the worst case scenario.  Any casualty estimates 
would likely be grossly inaccurate due to the type of hazard, sources of exposure, contaminant 
concentration, contaminant toxicity, frequency, duration of exposure, and natural human 
variability in susceptibility to the contaminant.  In order for a contamination attack on the WDS 
to be effective, the contaminant(s) used must be highly toxic.  This paper assumes that the 
exposed population will suffer noticeable adverse effects which will cause immediate and 
noticeable decrease to operational readiness.  Low-level exposures, while still important, are not 
analyzed in the paper due to the difficulty of estimating health impact over time and the likely 




3. Analysis and Results 
 
This section explains the risk associated with an intentional attack on a military WDS.  In the 
example scenario, a contaminant of unknown toxicity and quantity was released in Water Tower 
1 at midnight.  WSVA2 methodologies are applied to the scenario to evaluate risk.  First, the 
components of risk are explained in detail.  Second, the uncertainties of risk are evaluated for 
their effect on the outcome.  Lastly, the outcomes and mitigation strategies are examined in a 
catastrophic scenario.     
 
3.1 Risk Classification  
 
A change in risk classification is required to quantify risk.  In the WSVA methodology, risk is a 
qualitative function of probability and severity.  In WSVA2, risk is determined as:  
       )                                                       
R is the overall risk, T is the threat characterized by the installation’s likelihood of terrorist attack, 
C are the consequences measured by the decision maker’s disutility, and V is the vulnerabilities 
assessed by the WSVA team (Torres et al., 2009).  Risk is often thought of as VCTR  , but 
this would imply a use of expected values, a conceptualization of risk that has significant problem 
(e.g., Aven and Guikema, 2014). For the purposes of this work, we will proceed with a 
VCTR   definition but acknowledge that this may be insufficient in some situations. It is, 








3.1.1 Threat determination  
 
The threat component is arguably the most uncertain aspect of security risk because it is difficult 
to estimate the probabilities of future threats.  However, game theorists have shown that terrorists 
shift their attention toward softer targets in reaction to the security investments made by 
defenders (McGill et al., 2007).  Although military WDS are not prime targets now, hostile 
groups or individuals may eventually shift their focus to water systems.  Terrorist attack 
occurrences from historical data can provide a starting point for quantifying the threat to the 
WDS.  We suggest here starting from the historic attack frequency data and using a quantitative, 
but judgment-based scale for assessing threat.  The political and geographic location of a 
particular facility is perhaps the single most important factor that influences this assessment.  A 
score of 0 indicts no threat and a score of 1 indicates certainty of imminent attack.  Figure 4 maps 
known actual terrorist attacks which occurred in 2012.  One can see that the terrorism 
concentration in the Middle East and Central Asia is many times higher than the continental U.S., 
which in turn reflects the regional threat level.  
 
This paper will not reveal actual threat levels to overseas military installations.  Instead, it will 
compare the relative threat at Blue Zone to five other fictitious U.S. military installations around 
the world (Table 1).  The Threat value used for Blue Zone (T = 0.70) is used in a later section to 
determine the Risk Scores.  DOD could substitute real threat data into the WSVA2 model to 









Figure 4.  Global Terrorist Attack Map 2012  
 
3.1.2 Consequence determination and Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)  
 
Multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) provides a theoretically strong method for combining 
preferences across multiple attributes for single decision-makers (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). The 
use of MAUT will help to eliminate inconsistent and conflicting preferences representations 
amongst both decision makers and risk assessors.  Each person may determine the consequences 
of a terrorist attack differently because utility theory is inherently a single-person preference 
Threat Installation
0.07 Capital Military District (Washington D.C.) 
0.70 Blue Zone (Middle East) 
0.68 Camp Patton (Southeast Asia) 
0.32 DMZ (Korea) 
0.73 Camp Smith (North Africa) 
0.01 Jefferson National Labs (U.S.) 




model.  This flexibility in measuring disutility allows each decision maker to judge the 
importance of their WDS in respect to the installation's military operations.  Through a series of 
interview questions and comparisons based on MAUT, the assessor finds the decision maker's 
disutility for each of the three possible consequent outcomes of an attack: 1) number of people 
exposed to a contaminant 2) destruction of WDS component (in dollars), and 3) service 
disruptions (in number of days without water).  Table 2 demonstrates what the decision maker’s 
disutility could look like for the first aspect, the number of people exposed to a contaminant with 
an example disutility function.  All three sets of disutility values are between 0 and 1.  A value of 
0 is the best possible outcome while a value of 1 is the worst possible outcome.  In practice, the 
disutility function would need to be assessed with the decision-maker for each facility. 
 





This category represents no consequence for the Hexagon.  People may 
have been exposed to the contaminant but it is under the MEG.  The U.S. 
mission in host country is not affected by the attack.  
0.2
This category represents a moderate consequence for the Hexagon.  215 
(3.12% - 6.23%) but less than 430 of the people are exposed to the 
contaminant over the MEG.  The U.S. mission in host country is slightly 
affected by the attack.  
0.4
This category represents a moderate consequence for the Hexagon.  430 
(6.23% - 12.5%) but less than 862 of the people are exposed to the 
contaminant over the MEG.  The U.S. mission in host country is 
somewhat affected by the attack.  
0.6
This category represents a severe consequence for the Hexagon.  862 
(12.5% - 25%) but less than 1725 of the people are exposed to the 
contaminant over the MEG.  The U.S. mission in host country is affected 
by the attack.  
0.8
This category represents an extreme consequence for the Hexagon.  
1725 (25% - 50%) but less than 3450 of the people are exposed to the 
contaminant over the MEG.  The U.S. mission in host country is heavily 
degraded by the attack.  
1
This category represents an catastrophic consequence for the Hexagon.  
3450 (> 50%) or more people are exposed to the contaminant over the 




The value tree helps the decision maker identify the importance of each attribute of consequence.  
Critical installation stakeholders can contribute to the weighting of the adverse measures.  An 
example value tree for the Blue Zone is shown in Figure 4.  Each installation should evaluate and 
assign their own relative importance for each consequence based on their unique situation.   
 
The consequence component of risk (C) is calculated using the standard multi-attribute utility 
calculation (see, for example, Keeney and Raiffa, 1976):  
      
 
            
Each consequence value is the summation of the weights (W) multiplied by the disutilities of 
each consequent outcome of an attack (U).  Note that we have assumed utility independence 
across the attributes here.  Other forms of the utility function are available if this assumption is 
not valid.      
 
3.1.3 Vulnerability determination  
 
An Army risk assessor will conduct a site inspection to determine the vulnerability for each WDS 
component.  The vulnerability score represents the risk assessor’s probability assessment of 
attacker success which range from 0 to 1 as shown in Table 3.  The vulnerability criteria 
description is purposely left vague and should be not discussed in open literature due to security 
concerns.  Nevertheless, detailed descriptions are need for consistent vulnerability assessment.  
As a recommendation, the WSVA program could use a security checklist to score each 








Table 3.  Constructed Scale for Vulnerability  
  
 
Similar to the calculation of the consequence score, the vulnerability (V) value is the summation 
of the weights (W) multiplied by each vulnerability (v) score to contamination, physical 
destruction and cyber attack.   
      
 
                                             
 
3.2 Quantification of Risk  
 
As an example of the process, I acted as the risk assessor and compiled a list of adverse scenarios 
for Blue Zone and evaluated risk based on the methodology described in the previous section.  
Recall from an earlier section that the Threat value used for Blue Zone is 0.70.  Table 4 provides 
a list of consequence values based the decision maker disutility preference.  However, these 
values are subjective until hydraulic modeling can verify the outcome for each scenario.  The 
vulnerability values provided for each scenario are assigned base on the WDS component’s 
resistance to contamination, physical destruction and cyber.  The results are shown in Table 4.  
The initial assessment finds that the risk of physical destruction and cyber attack to key military 
WDS components is negligible, which reflects the historical data on WDS attacks (USACHPPM 
TG 188, 2008).  This of course could change in the future due to adversary adaptation, but for the 
present example cyber attack and physical destruction of components will not be considered 
further.  
Score Description 
0 Existing control measures impossible to overcome
0.2 Existing control measures difficult to overcome
0.4 Existing control measures remotely possible to overcome
0.6 Existing measures inadequate
0.8 Minimal protective measures in place




Contamination of Water Tower 1 and Water Tank 2 had risk scores of 0.14 and 0.04 respectively.  
These risk scores reflect the situation at the moment of the assessment and can change as either 
one of the three risk components changes.  Scenario 1’s score of 0.14 does not mean the scenario 
is 14 times more likely to occur than scenario 7 with a score of 0.01.  Rather, the scores reflect 
that the outcome of scenario 1 is 14 times more risky relative than scenario 7.  Although not 
every scenario needs hydraulic modeling, the assessor should verify those scenarios with the 
highest risks.  To demonstrate the practical use of hydraulic, contaminant fate and transport 
modeling, the paper will model the contamination of Water Tower 1(Scenario 1), which also had 
the highest risk score.   
 





“The sheer size of drinking water sources and distribution systems (both in terms of water volume 
and detention time) and the presence of existing treatment processes significantly reduce the 
effectiveness of such an attack on a water source or treatment plant. Intentional contamination of 
Scenarios Type of Attack Components T C V Risk
1 Contamination Water Tower #1 0.70 0.50 0.40 0.14
2 Contamination Water Tank #2 0.70 0.50 0.10 0.04
3 Contamination Primary Pump 0.70 0.20 0.00 0.00
4 Contamination Hexagon Pump 0.70 0.08 0.00 0.00
5 Contamination Pipe 163 0.70 0.58 0.00 0.00
6 Physical Destruction Water Tower #1 0.70 0.06 0.11 0.00
7 Physical Destruction Water Tank #2 0.70 0.15 0.11 0.01
8 Physical Destruction Primary Pump 0.70 0.21 0.11 0.02
9 Physical Destruction Hexagon Pump 0.70 0.01 0.04 0.00
10 Physical Destruction Pipe 163 0.70 0.01 0.14 0.00
11 Cyber Attack Water Tower #1 0.70 0.00 0.03 0.00
12 Cyber Attack Water Tank #2 0.70 0.00 0.03 0.00
13 Cyber Attack Primary Pump 0.70 0.00 0.03 0.00
14 Cyber Attack Hexagon Pump 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00




a raw water supply using a known or potential biological warfare agent, for example, would 
require at least 30,000 times the toxic dose for each individual placed at risk, even neglecting 
natural attenuation and ordinary treatment efficacy. This is not an effective point to contaminate 
the supply unless massive amounts of contaminant are applied. This type of attack, in order to be 
effective, would likely be aimed at a storage tank or a part of the distribution system serving a 
specific high-profile building” (USACHPPM TG 188, 2008). 
 
Serious attackers would recognize that water dilution is a major obstacle in a contamination 
attack.  Out of the dozens of possible injection point in the WDS, Water Tower 1 is selected as 
the most likely contamination location.  The intended target of the attack is the Hexagon building.  
Scenario 1 consists of an unknown quantity of one or more contaminants released into Water 
Tower 1 at 12:00 a.m.  The hydraulic and water quality simulation of the WDS was modeled 
using EPANet 2.0 for duration of 168 hours (1 week).  This duration corresponds to the 7 day 
MEG.  Recall that people who consumed water from a contaminated node are counted as 
population exposed to the contaminant.  The goal of hydraulic modeling of a contaminant is to 
assess how the contamination spreads (Torres et al., 2009).  Therefore, this paper will not 
speculate on the short and long term adverse health efforts of unknown contaminants.  
Nevertheless, when consumption of the contaminant is greater than the 7 day MEG for 7 days, 
there is cause for health concerns.   
 
3.4 Uncertainties in model inputs 
 
In the base scenario, an unknown contaminant was released into the water tower.  Some 
assumptions about the WDS characteristics were made, such as instantaneous mixing.  Three 
important unknown inputs of the model are 1) type of contaminant used (based on MEG), 2) 




model input will propagate to uncertainties in the model output.  Monte Carlo simulations, a 
technique based on repeated random samplings is used to obtain the distribution of an unknown 
probabilistic function (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Carlo_method).  In order to quantify 
the uncertainties in the model output, 2500 contamination simulations of scenario 1 were 
conducted using MATLAB 2013a.     
 
The three uncertainty parameters of the model are displayed in Table 5.  The toxicity of the 
contaminant is judged on the basis of the MEG and was modeled as a Lognormal (-0.0146, 2.816) 
distribution generated from 167 known 7-Day Negligible MEG from USAPHC Technical Guide 
230 (2010).  Each simulation randomly generates a contaminant toxicity based on this 
distribution.  Since the contaminant used in the attack is unknown, its aquatic characteristics are 
also unknown.  A normal (-0.5, 0.25) distribution curve is used to generate the reaction rate of the 
contaminant for each simulation.  The benefit of using random reaction rates is that it could 
represent the synergetic effort of two or more contaminants.  The contaminant quantity is 
generated from a lognormal (-0.168, 0.642) distribution from Torres et al. based on a mass of 
93.75 kg (Torres, 2009).   
 
Table 5.  Uncertainty Distribution 
 
The hydraulic models are able to verify the potential danger of a contamination attack on Water 
Tower 1.  As a result, the assessor could use the hydraulic data as evidence to recommend 
countermeasures to lower the Risk Score for scenario 1.  Monte Carlo simulations were 
conducted in MATLAB 2013a and the results of the histogram are shown in Figure 5.  In 1,176 of 
Input Distribution Mean Standard deviation Notes
MEG Lognormal -0.0146 2.816 Closely matches U.S. Army data on known contaminant MEGs
Reaction Rate Normal -0.5 0.25 Simulates chemical reaction speed in water 




the simulations (47%), people were not exposed above the above the MEG level.  The mode from 
the Monte Carlo simulations is 0 EI while the median was 230 EI.  One can speculate that a 
random, unplanned attack using common contaminants in reasonably large quantities may not 
expose consumers above the 7 day negligible MEG.  However, nearly 53% of the contamination 
simulations were over the MEG level ranging from 230 to 405,503 EI.  The expected outcome is 
53,126 EI, a figure not to taken lightly for decision makers.     
 
A percentile graph derived from the Monte Carlo simulations show the variability in population 
exposure (Figure 6).  The results show that contaminant uncertainties in model inputs produced 
high variability in exposure levels.  Also, the exposure occurs during the daytime hours between 
7:00AM and 8:00PM each day which corresponded to the period of highest water demand.  
Understandably, exposure decreases to near zero when people leave their work at night.  In most 
simulations, EI decreased each day due to contaminant decay over time.  Near the 50th percentile, 
the population of Hexagon is barely exposed to contaminant concentrations above the MEG.  At 
the 75 percentile, the EIs spike initially but decay to almost zero after four days.  In the  worst 
contamination simulation given the distributions, an estimated 9,000 EIs occurred daily without 
any abatement.  Recall that 6,900 people work in the Hexagon building.  A dangerous 
contaminant could conceivably cause significant illness for the exposed population, which 
represents 58% (4,000) of Hexagon employees.  One hidden aspect of only accounting for above 
MEG exposure is that a widespread contaminant in the WDS may cause more exposure but less 





Figure 5.  Histogram for 2500 Simulations 
 
 





The results from Monte Carlo simulations provided a range of possible outcomes given many 
stochastic input variables.  In order for the predicted outcome to be accurate, it helps that 
contaminant characteristics are known.  Attackers have an advantage in terms of information 
because of the asymmetric nature of the conflict (Brown et al., 2012).  Public web sites offer 
useful infrastructure information that could be used by terrorists to conduct their own hydraulic 
modeling.  The Al Qaeda training manual states that it is possible to gather at least 80% of enemy 
information from public sources (Federation of American Scientists, 2006).  If our adversaries 
can obtain infrastructure blue print and consumption data through public means, they would 
likely have enough information to built somewhat accurate hydraulic models for U.S. military 
installations.  Combined with the knowledge of the contaminant characteristics, our adversaries 
can optimize contamination methods to strike against the U.S. military WDS.  It is ironic then 
that this tool may better support the attackers, who can decide the type of chemicals used, where 
to contaminate, how much contaminant to use, and the time.  Therefore, it is imperative that 
military installations protect their public data. 
 
 
3.5 Evaluation of a Catastrophic Scenario 
 
Due to the enormous stakes involved in military operation, decision makers always want to know 
the worst case scenario.  However, the “worst case” scenario is rarely predictable despite however 
improbable it may seem.  Instead, the assessor can present the worst outcome from the 
simulations to the decision maker as a possible catastrophic scenario.  The most catastrophic  
outcome generated from the 2500 simulations of Scenario 1 had a contaminant concentration of 




extremely toxic.  Unlike the vast majority of the generated contaminants, this contaminant 
multiplied in the water supply, which mimics a biological microorganism.   
 
In order to visualize how contaminants propagation throughout the Hexagon Building, a Day 1 
timeline is created with commentary below (Figure 7).  The eight hour time series is advanced in 
increments of two hours to demonstrate how office hour demand can affect the hydraulic 
characteristics of the WDS. 
 
7:00 AM: 632 EI have occurred in the Hexagon building.  The sudden demand increase caused 
water to flow from Water Tower 1 into the WDS.  Prior to this time, water from the water 
treatment plants were sufficient to meet the overnight usage. 
 
9:00 AM: 14,908 EI have occurred in the Hexagon building in two hours.  The contaminant had 
spread to the northern half the Hexagon’s point of consumption nodes.  It is also when the 
contamination is at its highest concentration peak.   
 
11:00 AM: 32,545 EI have occurred in the Hexagon building in four hours.  The contaminant 
concentration in the Hexagon pipelines has decreased overall from two hours ago.  However, 
more exposure incidents are occurring due to lunch time activities.  Notice in the center of the 
Hexagon plaza, the Hexagon café node is active causing many more EI. 
 
01:00PM: 50,539 EI have occurred in the Hexagon since 7:00AM.  Water demand usages 
decrease such that the hydraulic characteristics in the Hexagon building had reverted back to the 
low demand pattern.  Water in the north half of the Hexagon building is now flowing from the 




still remnants of contaminated water left in a portion of the Hexagon building that continued to 
cause exposure.  
 
In our catastrophic simulation of Scenario 1, over 400,000 EI occurred in 168 hours.  Each day, 
the rise and fall of the number of EI is closely correlated to the actual water demand.  Although it 
is difficult to predict the final health impact from the contamination attack, the contaminant’s 
potential danger may be inferred from known databases.  Our unknown contaminant was 
compared to a list of known cytotoxicity, or toxins harmful to cells.  Out of this list of 347 toxins 
(http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/iccvam/docs/acutetox_docs/guidance0801/appa.pdf), only two had a 
LD50 concentration less than our initial contaminant concentration in Water Tower 1.  Assuming 
the worst, suppose that the contaminant dumped into the Water Tower is one of these two 
extremely dangerous toxins.  From our comparative speculation, people who were exposed to 




Figure 7.  Contaminant Propagation  
 
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted on the model output of Scenario 1-catastrophic simulation.  




quantity of the contaminant) is isolated and evaluated while the other two remain at their initial 
value (catastrophic simulation).  The input for contaminant used and contaminant quantity are 
incrementally increased from 0 mg/L to measure the corresponding EI output.  In the case of 
reaction rate, the values range from -10 to +10 to produce the EI reactions.   
 
The number of EI is extremely sensitive to the toxicity of the contaminant (Figure 8a).  Recall 
that the toxicity is judged by the contaminant's MEG values, comparable to EPA's MCL values.  
As the MEG drops from 5.24 mg/L to 0 mg/L, exposure incidents quickly jump to the maximum 
number of EI possible for the Hexagon Building, estimated at 477,052 over 168 hours.   
 
The reaction rate of the contaminant has the least influence over the number of EI (Figure 8b).  
Chemical contaminants will have a decay or growth rate.  Unfortunately, EPANet 2.0 does not 
model the propagation of biological contaminants.  Therefore, the use of a biological contaminant 
will provide more uncertainty than chemical contaminants.   
 
The number of EI is not particularly sensitive to the quantity of the substance used in the attack 
(Figure 8c).  A minimum quantity of 1.67 kg of the unknown contaminant is required in the 
attack on Water Tower 1 in order to trigger exposure above the MEG threshold in the Hexagon 
Building.  At the MEG threshold, the contaminant quantity would cause 350,000 EI.  Further 
increases in the quantity would only result in marginal increases in EI.  It takes significantly more 
contaminant quantity to eventually reach the maximum exposure incident.  However, increased 
contaminant quantity will also increase contaminant concentration.  Although EI responded 
marginally to the increases in contaminant quantity, the dose-response curve of the exposed 
population would likely be much more sensitive to the increase in contaminant concentration.  
The contaminant quantity is significant because an increase in concentration will increase toxicity 




 The model output (EI) is significantly sensitive to two of the three input factors  (toxicity and 
reaction rate) in our scenario modeling.  Significant EI uncertainty exist in the number of EI 
because assumptions are made to represent strong simplifications, relevant data is not available, 
and there is lack of agreement among experts (Flage, 2009).  As a result, small changes in our 








Figure 8.  Sensitivity Analysis of (a) MEG Sensitivity, (b) Contaminant Reaction Rate Sensitivity, (c) Quantity 




3.7 Emergency Response Plan Evaluation  
 
Hydraulic, contaminant fate and transport modeling are used to evaluate Blue Zone’s ERP in the 
added step of the WSVA2 methodology.  It is probable that a determined, competent person 
could carry out a successful contamination attack on the military WDS despite countermeasures.  
Therefore, it is important to determine whether the current ERP can sufficiently mitigate the 
contamination threat.  
 
An attack response scenario is generated based on known mitigation practices and existing 
research.  The timeline of events are arbitrary.  In our attack response scenario, the water quality 
monitors notified the Department of Public Works (DPW) that water quality in the Hexagon has 
dropped below acceptable levels.  In accordance with the ERP in a high threat region, DPW 
started flushing water out from preselected fire hydrants (node 12, 112, 10) and from the 





Figure 9.  Flushing Nodes 
 
At 7PM on Day 1 (t = 19 hours), these nodes were opened to flush out the contaminants in the 
WDS.  The combined flow rates at the flushing nodes are 2,000 GPM.  The plan required 
continuously flushing until the water quality is under the MEG.  The results of this mitigation are 
compared against taking no action for the Scenario 1 in Figure 10.  In this scenario, flushing 
efforts managed to noticeably reduce the concentration at all the contaminated nodes in the WDS.  
Nevertheless, the response failed to bring the level below the MEG over time.  Flushing the 
predestinated hydrants in the ERP are not effective.  This paper did not attempt to optimize 
flushing effectiveness by testing the entire range of possible hydrant combinations, but it is likely 







Figure 10.  Flushing Effectiveness  
 
The second mitigation strategy involves notifying all personnel to stop consuming water in a 
manner that would cause exposure.  After some investigation and water testing, DPW decided 
that Water Tower 1 was infiltrated and likely contaminated by hostile groups or individuals.  
Unfortunately, the water quality notification was not distributed to the general public until 1:00 
AM on day 2.  People notified each other through direct communication, social media, and word 
of mouth.  From 1AM (day2) to 7PM (day2), 10% of the unnotified population was alerted and 
chose to stop tap water consumption each hour and switched to bottled water.  The notification 
compliance rate ranged from 42% to 84% in a number of historical studies (Zechman, 2011).  In 
our scenario, 85% of the largely military population complied with the notification by 7PM on 





Figure 11.  Mitigation Comparison Analysis 
 
The results show that a dramatic reduction in military water consumption led to a significant 
decrease in EI.  In comparison, the attempt to flush out the contaminant only had some success in 
lowering EI (Figure 11).  Applying the combined strategy of notification and flushing is only 









A quantifiable approach to military WSVA offer decision makers the ability to make better 
informed decisions.  The use of hydraulic models is able to verify the potential dangerous 
scenario conceived by risk assessor.  53,126 EI resulted from the contamination attack on Water 
Tower 1.  The analysis also speculated on the results of the most catastrophic simulation given 
the contaminant’s input parameters.  Over 400,000 EI occurred in 1 week which affected over 
4,000 people in the Hexagon Building.  As a result, people who were exposed to multiple EI are 
at serious health risk and the attack would have likely cripple the Hexagon’s military operations 
indefinitely.  The model output (EI) is significantly sensitive to two of the three input factors 
(toxicity and reaction rate) in our scenario modeling.  As a result, small changes in our input will 
result in large changes in our output.  In a catastrophic scenario, the current ERP can not 
sufficiently mitigate the contamination threat below MEG level.  The flushing strategy from the 
pre-designated hydrants is only somewhat effective in lower the contaminant concentration but 
the notification strategy resulted in significant decreases in EI over time.  Unfortunately, the 
combined strategy of notification and flushing is not enough flush out the contaminant over time. 
 
4.2 Future Work 
 
Current military budget realities may reduce the WSVA program altogether if it is not effective.  
Realistically, the local military installation Anti-Terrorism office can conduct all the aspects of 
the WSVA without a dedicated team of risk assessors.  However, the local AT offices still need to 
verify their own findings with the WSVA assessors at U.S. Army Public Health Command 




assessment with the provided information.  A cost benefit analysis on a pilot WSVA2 program 
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